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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
OGDEN CITY, a Municipal Corporation,
Plaintiff,
Case No.
7779

vs.
FERRELL H. ADAMS, State Treasurer of Utah,
Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as plaintiff has included in its Statement
of Facts certain information which is not contained in
the pleadings, defendant deems it advisable to make a
separate Statement of Facts.
In the interest of clarity and to arrive at the true
state of facts upon which the Court 1nust determine this
3
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case, Defendant will follow Plaintiff's Statement of
Facts.
1. In paragraph 1, page · 1, Plaintiff's Brief,
Plaintiff points out that during the period of J\iarch
31, 1951, to August 27, 1951, five criminal actions,
each with more than one defendant, for violation of Section 46-0-237, Utah Code Annotated 1943, were prosecuted in Weber County, State of Utah. Said criminal
actions were successfully prosecuted and substantial
funds resulted as fines and forfeitures. There is no
evidence in the record as to the other facts contained in
said paragraph L

2. All fines and forfeitures in the criminal cases
have been sent to the Defendant herein, and the Defendant now has the same in his possession and control.
3. The Plaintiff, pursuant to Section 46-0-219, obtained certificates from the Judges who presided at the
hearings at each of the criminal cases. The (;;ertificates
of the Judges, in each case, read in part as follows:

TO THE STATE TREASURER OF THE
STATE OF UTAH:
I, --------------------------------, one of the Judges of the
District Court of 1lveber County, State of Utah,
hereby certify:
1. That the prosecution of the above entitled
case was initiated by officers of Ogden City, and
the evidence was obtained by and at the expense
4
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of said Ogden City, and officers of Ogden City
assisted in the successful prosecution of said case,
and as provided by Section 46-0-219, Utah Code
Annotated, 19±3, all fines, forfeitures or costs
paid to yqu as the result of said prosecution
should be paid to Ogden City.
2. It is therefore recon1mended that all fines,
forfeitures, and costs received by you in this case
be paid to Ogden City.
Dated this---------------- day of September, 19,51.

Judge
I, the Chairman of the Utah State Liquor
Commission, hereby approve the payment of all
fines, forfeitures and costs received in the above
entitled case to Ogden City.

Chairman
Utah State Liquor Commission
(Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
It is to be noted that the Judge in each case certified
that "officers of Ogden City assisted in the successful
prosecution of said case" and made a recommendation
that the fines, forfeitures and costs be paid to Ogden

City.
4. The Chairman of the Utah State Liquor Control
Commission, in writing approved the payment of all said
5
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fines, forfeitures and costs to Ogden City. (Exhibits 1,
2, 3, 4, 5.)
5. 'l_lhere 1s no evidence in the record as to any
hearing had by the Judges of the District Court of
Weber County before issuing of the certificates.
6. Certificates of the various Judges of the Second
Judicial District Court state that the various criminal
cases were initiated by officers of Ogden City, and it is
a fair inference that all of the defendants in said cases
were bound over to the District Court for trial. However, as to the other facts contained in paragraph 6
of Plaintiff's Brief, there is no evidence in the record.
7. There is no evidence in the record as to what
assistance the attorneys for Ogden City may have given
the District Attorney in the prosecution of the various
criminal cases set forth in paragraph 3 of Plaintiff's
complaint, nor is there any evidence concerning how
much work the District Attorney had to do in preparing
and prosecuting the cases.
8. Demand has been made by the plain tiff on the
defendant for remittance to it of all fines and forfeitures
he has received from the five criminal cases, and the
defendant has refused to mak€ said remittance.
9. Certain additional facts have been pleaded into
the record by the defendant in this case which briefly
are as follows:
(j
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On Decmnber 9, 1938, the then State Auditor J·ay
\Y. Guy requested an opinion fron1 the IIonorable Joseph
Chez, Attorney General of the State of Utah, concerning
an interpretation of Chapter -!3, Section 177, Laws of
rtah 1935, which i::; nmY codified as 46-0-219 Utah Code
Annotated 19-!3 (Exhibit 6). In response to this request,
the Attorney General issued a series of three. opinions,
Exhibits 7, 8 and 9, interpreting the provisions of Section -!6-0-:219. Defendant has also alleged (which for the
purpose of this case n1ust be taken as true), that the
Defendant and his predecessors in office have at no time
refunded any fines and forfeitures imposed under fu.e
Liquor Control Act by District Courts of the State of
Utah. Defendant has also alleged, that the cities, towns
and counties of the State of Utah have acquiesced in the
interpretation of the Attorney General of Section 46-0219 Utah Code Annotated 1943, continuously since the
year 1939. It is submitted that upon this limited set of
facts, and such facts as the Court may take judicial
notice of, are the factual basis for a determination herein.

STATEl\!lENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE WORDING OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1943, IS SO AMBIGUOUS AS TO REQUIRE
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND BY THE EXPRESS
WORDS OF SAID SECTION IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE FINES IN
DEFENDANT'S HANDS.

7

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT II.
WHILE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ARE
NOT CONTROLLING, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT
RESPECT IN CONSTRUING AN AMBIGUOUS STATUTE.

POINT III.
OGDEN CITY IS A CITY OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AND AS SUCH HAS ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1943.

POINT IV.
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS
ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
PLACED UPON SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1943.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE WORDING OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1943, IS SO AMBIGUOUS AS TO REQUIRE
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND BY THE EXPRESS
WORDS OF SAID SECTION IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO BE PAID THE FINES IN
DEFENDANT'S HANDS.

Section 46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943, reads
as follows:
All fines and forfeitures levied under this act
shall be paid to the state treasurer and credited
to the general fund; provided, however, that in all
cases where violations of this act are prosecuted
to a conviction by the officer of any town, city or
8
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county the judge of the court wherein such prosecution took place shall certify to the state
treasurer that such prosecution was conducted
by the officers of such town, city or county,
and the state treasurer, on the written approval
of the chairnmn of the counnission, shall pay to
said town, city or county all an1ounts collected
as fines, forfeitures or costs as the result of such
prosecution.
There are two phrases in the foregoing section which,
we submit, are so mnbiguous as to require statutory
interpretation. The phrase "prosecuted to a conviction
by the officer of any town, city or county" and the phrase
"prosecution was conducted by the officers of such town,
city or county" give rise to the ambiguity in Section
46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943. There can be no
doubt under the terms of the statute that all fines and
forfeitures levied under the Liquor Control Act should
be paid to the State Treasurer and credited to the general fund. It is only which fines should be returned to
the towns, cities and counties by the State Treasurer
that is not clearly spelled out. Plaintiff asserts that the
defendant "refuses to agree that it [the statute] means
what it says when it provides that "all" fines growing out
of local prosecution (without restriction as to the court
of origin) shall be repaid to the local unit." If Section
46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943 made such a provision as the plaintiff asserts; i.e., that all fines growing
out of local prosecutions should be returned to the local
unit, this controversy would not and could not have
arisen. It is only in "all cases where violations of this
9
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Act are prosecuted to a conviction by the officer of any
town, city or county • • *" that the fines and forfeitures
shall be returned to the local unit. Had the Legislature
intended to have all fines and forfeitures returned to the
local subdivisions when the officers of the local units
initiated the prosecution or appeared as witnesses in
the criminal cases, or, if such officers were associated
in the successful prosecution of the criminal cases, it
would have been, we submit, a simple matter to so provide. The Legislature, however, did not so provide and
therefore it must be determined what the intention of
the Legislature was when it provided that fines should
be returned "in all cases w.here violations of this Act
are prosect(,ted to a conviction by the officer of any town,
city or county."
From a reading of certain sections of the Liquor
Control Act it would appear that the Legislature intended that city attorneys would prosecute violations of the
Liquor Control Act in the city courts. Section 46-0-206
provides in part :
If any district, county, city or town attorney,
or any peace officer, or any other person has
probable cause to believe that alcoholic beverages are possessed, 1nanufactured, sold, bartered,
given away or otherwise furnished in violation
of this act, or are kept for the purpose of selling,
bartering or giving away or otherwise furnishing
the same in violation of law, it shall be the duty
of such attorney, peace officer or person forthwith to make and file with the judge of the district
10
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or eit~: court, -or any eity, town or precinct justice
of the peace, written infonnation supported. by
his oath or affinnation that he has information
and reason to believe that this act is being violated at a certain plaee, stating the facts within
his k~owledge: and he shall describe as particularly as may be the place, and the names of the
persons, if known, participating in such unlawful
act. • • •
The concluding sentence In the foregoing section
provides:
Any peace officer who shall.-make a seizure of
alcoholic beverages or any other property under
the provisions of this act shall forthwith report
in writing, on forms supplied by the commission,
to the prosecuting attorney of the city or county
in which such seizure was made, and also to the
commission, with detailed information as to the
property seized and persons arrested, and the
address of the place fron1 which such property
was seized.
This section contemplates, at least, that the comlnencement of searches and seizures of property pursuant to the Liquor Control Act, can be initiated by a
city or town attorney in a city court or before town or
city justices of the peace. Section 46-0-210 Utah Code
Annotated 1943, terminates the jurisdiction of. the city
court or justice of the peace when it appears that tangible personal property was seized by an officer and the
city court or Justice of the peace must certify the record
and all files to the District Court of th~ county in which
the premises are situated for further proceedings.
11
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Section 46-0-216 provides in part as follows:·
"All inspectors appointed under this aet, and
all sheriffs, deputy sheriffs,. mayors, city judges,
justices of the peace, constables, marshals and
peace officers, and all district county, city and
town attorneys, and clerks of courts shall diligently enforce the provisions of this act. * * ~
(Italics added).
and also

* * * *
"Immediately upon conviction of any person
in any town, city or county for violation of any
provisions of this Act, or for violation of any city
ordinace relating to alcoholic beverages, it shall
be the duty of the clerk of the court or the justice
of the peace to notify the comission of such conviction, giving in writing full particulars of the
case on forms supplied by the commission * * *."
(Italics added).
The above quoted portions of Section 46-0-216 Utah
Code Annotated 1943, would seem to indicate that the
Legislature intended that city attorneys would prosecute
violations of the provisions of the Liquor Control Act
in the city courts, in which case the fines could be returned to the city.
Sections 46-0-24 7 and 248 impose the duty of enforcenlent of the Liquor Control Act on all city, posecut-ing and peace officers. The Legislature, in these two
sections, we sub1nit, assun1e that a city prosecuting officer was different than a city peace officer.
12
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'Vhile the foregoing quoted sections do not spell
out a clear cut procedure insofar as city attorneys and
city courts are concerned, we sub1nit that the Legislature
contemplated that the violations of the Liquor Control
Act could be prosecuted by a city attorney and thus
Section 46-0-219 is not a nullity as far as the cities and
towns are concerned. The Legislature contemplated
that control of the possession, sale and transportation ·of
alcoholic beverages would be enforced . by the Liquor
Control Conm1ission. Section 46-0-48 (e) imposes such
duty on the Liquor Control Commission and this fact
is not altered by the abolition of the Liquor Commission's enforcement unit by executive fiat. The Legislature also imposed the duty of enforcement of the Liquor
Control Act upon all city, county, precinct and state executive, prosecuting and peace officers. Plaintiff's assertion that the enforcement of criminal laws must be made
financially worth while to legal subdivisions of the State,
we submit, is without basis in reason, or in fact. All such
officers are bound by the statutes and by their oaths
of office to enforce the laws and to say that such local
units must be reimbursed under Section 46-0-219 Utah
Code Annotated 1943, in order to make them more enthusiastic about expending their money and time and
efforts in Liquor Control activities is a fiction which this
state should not, and cannot adopt.
Plaintiff asserts that the Legislature has set forth
three controlling factors in the matter of remittance of
fines and forfeitures: (1) Prosecution to a conviction
by officers of a town, city o·r county; (2) Certifieation

13
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of that fact to the State Treasurer by the Judge of the
court wherein such prosecution took place; and (3) \Vritten approval by the Chair1nan of the Liquor Conuriission
of the 'remittance to the town, city or county of said fines
and forfeitures. We think this is a fair interpretation of
the statute.' However, we submit that the Attorney Gen·eral's opinion that fines imposed by the District Courts
is only a test which the Attorney General advised the
auditor to use in 1naking his examinations, and that if a
violation of the Liquor Control Act is prosecuted in a
district court of the State of Utah that such prosecution
cannot and is not "prosecuted to a conviction by the officers of a town, city or county.
The plaintiff asserts that the defendant admits that
condition No.2 has been cmnplied with. Such, we submit,
is not the case. The defendant in paragraph 4 of his An-swer, denied that the several Judges of the Court wherein such prosecutions took place certified to the defendant
that such prosecutions were conducted by the officers
of Ogden City. The defendant alleged that the Judges
-of the District Court wherein the prosecutions took place
executed certificates that the officers of Ogden City assisted in the successful prosecution of the cases and inc~uded as exhibits Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 copies of the
·said certificates.
It can, we believe, be fairly assumed that grave
doubts existed in the minds of the various District Court
,Judges as to whether the officers . of Ogden City did
prosecute these cases to a conviction. The certificate
14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

with regard to the initiating of the cases by officers of
Ogden City, and with regard to the evidence being obtained by, and at the expense of Ogden City is a nullity
under the plaintiff's theory of the case. Such certification
as to these 1natters need not have been made. The only
thing which the Court need certify to is "that such prosecution was conducted by the officers of said town, city or
county • • * ." 'Ve submit that the plaintiff must fail in
this action if for no other reason than that the Certificate
of the Distriet Court Judges does not properly certify
that the conviction was conducted by the officers of
Ogden City. Such certificate, on its face, merely states
that the officers of Ogden City assisted in the successful prosecution of the case and this, we submit, is not
sufficient. Fundamentally, however, it will be of great
assistance if the Court will decide the issue which was
intended to be presented, and and give a judicial interpretation of the words "prosecuted to a conviction" and
"prosecution was conducted by the office·rs of said town,
city or county." It is submitted that the only practical
interpretation which can be placed upon these words is
the interpretation which the Attorney General arrived
at in 1939 which is that if a violation of the Liquor Control Act is prosecuted in the District Court, that of
necessity such prosecution was conducted by the District
Attorney who is a state officer and not an officer of
any town, city or county.
POINT II.
WHILE OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ARE
NOT CONTROLLING, THEY ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT
RESPECT IN CONSTRUING AN AMBIGUOUS STATUTE.

15
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Admittedly any opinion of the Attorney General,
no Inatter of how long a standing, is not binding upon the
Court. liowever, we subinit that the Court should give
great weight to the opinions of the Attorney General
which in this case, have been consistently followed for a
period in excess of thirteen years. rrhe r nited States
Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Badger v. Hoidale, 88 F. (2d) 208, 109 ALR 798, considered the weight
which should be given to an opinion of the attorney general with regard to the interpretation to be given an
mnendment to the l\1:innesota Constitution and held:

"* * * This opinion is, of course, not binding
on this court, but it is entitled to great respect and
should not be departed from lightly. Standard
Computing Scale Co. v. Farrell (D.C.) 242 F. 87."
The court further stated with regard to a statement
of the attorney general concerning the amendment:
"This statement, furnished by the Attorney
General in the performance of his public duty, is
entitled to consideration. Yosemite Lumber Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Comm., 187 Cal. 774, 204 P. 226,
20 ALR 994; Beneficial Loan Society v. Haight,
215 Cal. 506, 11 P. (2d) 857; Bearden v. Collins,
220 Cal. 759, 32 P. (2d) 604."
True it is that the opinions of the Attorney General
do not cite any authority, and there was some uncertainty
in the mind of the State Auditor when the opinions were
written. flowever, in the last opinion of the Attorney
16
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General, issued April 18, 1939, (Exhibit 9), the Attorney General stated :
"No payrnent 1nay be made to a town, city
or county under the provisions of said section
177 for the reason that the prosecuting officer- of
the town, city or county, appeared in the court
to prosecute the case."
The Attorney General took the view that where a
prosecution was conducted in the district courts that
the district attorney was prosecuting the case and that
anyone appearing in the district court would be appearing on behalf of the district attorney. Such interpretation of the statute, we submit, gives various officials who
must be guided by the statute a clean cut practical interpretation of the statute. The various court clerks, city,
county and state auditors and the state treasurer must,
of necessity, have some guide to follow. This, we submit,
was what the Attorney General attempted to give them
and that even though no authority was cited by the Attorney General, we submit that his reasoning was sound
and should not be lightly overturned. A number of situations might be envisioned whereby the state treasurer
or a judge having to decide the matter in order to make
his certificate would be in grave doubt as to who prosecuted the case if the broad, liberal interpretation asserted
by the plaintiff herein were followed; that is if the word
"prosecuted" was intended by the Legislature to mean
any assistance given to the district attorney in the prosecution of the case. For instance, if an inspector of the
Liquor Control Commission requested the aid of city
17
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peace officers and the county sheriff in conducting a raid
on an establishment where it was known that liquor was
being sold, it would then be necessary for all of the peace
·officers conducting the raid to appear as witnesses-as
prosecuting witnesses-in conducting the prosecution to
final conviction. Now, can it be said that the officer of
any particular political subdivision conducted the prosecution to a conviction? \Ve submit not. The only appropriate test which should be applied as to whether the
fine shall be returned to the political subdivisions or not
is to consider the Court in which such prosecutions took
place, and to consider who in fact conducted the prosecution. Insofar as prosecutions in the district court, we
submit that the district attorney by law and by custom
is the ·one who conducts the prosecution to final conviction. Admittedly a situation might arise whereby the
officers of a county could prosecute to final conviction
in the district court, a violation of the Liquor Control
Act. SuCh a situation might be where a sheriff of a
county makes an arrest pursuant to the provisions of
the Liquor Control Act, the county attorney conducts
the preli~inary hearing before the magistrate and then,
at the request of the district attorney, prosecutes the violation to conviction. In such a situation, the fines or
forfeitures collected in the case should properly be returned to the county.
In view of the broad duty imposed on city attorneys
by provisions of the Liquor Control Act, it is submitted
that a city attorney could, with permission of the county
and district attorney prosecute to a conviction a viola18
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tion of the Liquor Control Act both before the con1mitting
n1agistrate and on appeal, or trial in the district court.
These situations have not, insofar as the record shows,
ever arisen in the State of Utah and certainly at the time
the forn1er Attorney General wrote his opinion, he contemplated that all prosecutions for violations of the
Liquor Control Act which were prosecuted in the district
court would be under the direction of the district attorney. \Ve submit, therefore, that the interpretation which
should be given this statute, at least insofar as the district courts are concerned, is that unless it be made to
appear by the certificate of the Judge of the District
Court that the city attorney prosecuted the violation of
the Liquor Control Act to a convicJtion in his court, that
it must be assumed that the prosecution was conducted
by the district attorney and the fines cannot be remitted
to the city. This would be true even though city peace
officers as distinguished from the city prosecuting officer appeared as a witness in the prosecution.

POINT III.
OGDEN CITY IS A CITY OF THE STATE OF UTAH
AND AS SUCH HAS ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1943.

The defendant has alleged (which for the purpose
of this decision must be taken as true) that at no time
have any fines or forfeitures imposed by the district
courts of the State of Utah been refunded and that the
cities and towns and counties of the State of Utah have
19
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acquiesced in the interpretation placed on the said sec,.
tion by the attorney general. This, we submit, is a con~
temporaneous interpretation of the statutes and is entitled to great weigth. The rule is set forth in 50 Am.
J -qr., 309, Section 319, as follows :
"It has been said that the best construction
of a statute is that which it has received from
contemporary authority. 'Optima est legum inter
pres consuetudo.' In any event, if there is ambiguity in the .language, the understanding and
application of it when the statute first comes into
operation, sanctioned by long acquiescence on the
part of the legislature and judicial tribunals, are
the strongest evidence that it has been rightly explained in practice. The practical construction
given a statute for a long period of time has been
considered strong evidence of the 1neaning of the
law. Such contemporaneous or practical construction is treated by the courts as of importance, and
is entitled to great weight, respect, and persuasive influence. Indeed, the practical construction
of a statute, or the meaning publicly given it by
contemporary usage, is usually presumed to be the
true one. * * *"
This rule was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court
in the case of E. C. Olsen Company v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P. (2d) 324.
Plaintiff has asserted that Ogden City has not acquiesced in the administrative construction placed upon
Section 46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943. It further
asserts that Ogden City cannot be bound by other cities.
The only indication in the record with regard to the
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acquiescence of Ogden City is the allegation of the defendant that the "towns, cities and counties have acquiesced in such interpretation continuously since the
year 1939." 'Ye further sub1nit that the Court can take
judicial notice of the fact that Ogden City is a city of the
State of Utah. Plaintiff asserts in its brief that as far
as its counsel has been able to learn that these cases are
the first cases which Ogden City officers have prosecuted
in the District Court under the Liquor Control Act.
\Ve would sub1nit that this inforn1ation is not a part of
the record in this case and we further submit that it is
practically in1possible that the peace officers of Ogden
City would have gone for a period of thirteen years
without ever 1naking an arrest which resulted in a prosecution in the District Court for a violation of the Liquor
Control Act. The ad1ninistrative construction which the
defendant has followed in this case, we submit, is the
only practical construction of the statute and that there
has been a long well established, well known administra-tive interpretation in this matter, and that Ogden City
has acquiesced in the same.
True it is that before a Court need apply any rules of
statutory construction, the language of the statute in
question must be so an1biguous as to require statutory
construction. In this case there can be little doubt that
the words "prosecuted to a conviction" are ambiguous.
Plaintiff has cited no authority which proved helpful
to the Court in determining what this would mean, and
the defendant has been unable to find any case directly
construing such words, or any case which would prove
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particularly helpful 1n deter1nining what such words
mean.
Numerous definitions of the words "prosecution"
and "prosecuted" are set forth in Volume 34 Words and
Phrases page 615 et seq. These definitions would seem to
indicate that the word "prosecution" is a criminal proceeding at the suit of the government and is conducted
by a prosecuting attorney. The North Dakota Supreme
Court in the case of State v. Rozum, 80 N.W. 477, 479;
8 N.D. 548, had occasion to construe the word "prosecution" which was used in a statute similar to 46-0-222 Utah
Code Annotated 1943. In that case the court held:
''* * * but as used in the statute, the word
'prosecution' does not mean the making of a complaint merely but means a criminal action."

We submit, Therefore, that _Ogden City being a city
of the State of Utah has acquiesced in such interpretation
of the word "prosecution" for a period in excess of thirteen years and that such interpretation should now be
adopted by this court.
POINT IV.
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAS
ACQUIESCED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION
PLACED UPON SECTION 46-0-219 UTAH- CODE ANNOTATED 1943.

S€ction 46-0-219 Utah Code Annotated 1943, was
first passed by the Legislature in the year 1935 as Section 177, Laws of Utah 1935, Chapter 43. No amendment
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has been n1ade to this section since that time although
the Legislature has fr01n time to time amended other
sections of the Liquor Control Act.
The lT nited States Supren1e Court 1n the case of
United States Y. Farrar, 281 U. S. 624; 74 L. Ed. 1078,
had occasion to announce a rule which we submit is applicable in this case. The Court held as set forth in the
headnote:
"The fact that a construction, during a period
of ten years, by the executive departments
charged with its administration and enforcement,
of the provisions of the National Prohibition Act
relative to the issuance of permits for the purchase of liquor, as not including the ordinary
purchaser, has been acquiesced in by Congress,
is evidence of the correctness of such construction."
See also Van Dyke's Appeal, 217 Wis. 528; 259 N.W.
700, wherein the Court held:
"The inference that an . administrative construction of a state income tax law as warranting
the inclusion in taxable income of interest on nontaxable highway improvement bonds is correct
may be drawn from the failure of the legislature
during a period of several years to change such
construction by amending the statute."
The Legislature of the State of Utah, we submit,
has acquiesced in the interpretation placed on the statute
by the Attorney General in 1939, and such acquiescence,
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while not binding on the Court, should be given great
weight in the interpretation of. Section 4G-0-219 Utah
Code Annotated 1943.
CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing authorities and argument,
we submit that this Court should construe the words
"prosecuted to a conviction" and "prosecution was conducted by the officers of such city, town, or county * * *"
to mean that only in cases where violations of the Liquor
Control Act are prosecuted to a conviction by the prosecuting attorney of any city, town or county that the fines
imposed should be remitted to the local unit.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that the alternative writ heretofore issued be dismissed.

Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
G. HAL TAYLOR,
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant.

Defendant's Address :
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
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